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Abstract
In the pioneering article and two papers, written jointly with McKinsey, Tarski developed the
so-called algebraic and topological frameworks for the Intuitionistic Logic and the Lewis modal
system. In this paper, we present an outline of modern (non-Lewis) systems with a topological
tinge. We consider topological interpretation of basic systems GL and GRZ of the provability
logic in terms of the Cantor derivative and the Hausdor3 residue.
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In the pioneering article (appeared in 1938) and two papers [33,34] (written jointly
with J.C.C. McKinsey) Tarski developed the so-called algebraic and topological frame-
work for Intuitionistic Logic and Modal systems. These papers inCuenced a whole group
of logicians (we think of Tbilisi Group in particular) who cast their studies in algebraic
form and made considerable progress in analysis of various modal systems. Interest in
the papers was twofold: not only does it show that topological spaces provide a rich
semantical source for intuitionistic logic and modal systems, it also gives insight into
the algebraic properties of the collection of open sets of a topological space (Heyting
lattice) and of the algebra of the topological closure operation (closure algebra) and
the derivative operation (derivative algebra). It is also shown, among other things, that
the modal translation of intuitionistic logic proposed by GDodel does indeed rise to an
interpretation of the Heyting calculus in the Lewis system S4.
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We shall try to take the risk of presenting a brief survey (that, nevertheless, is
likely to be incomplete) of modern (non-Lewis) modal systems, especially those now
known as the G0odel–L0ob system GL and the Grzegorczyk system GRZ. What make
GL and GRZ of interest is their adequate arithmetical interpretation: when the box
is interpreted via the formula Bew(x) expressing provability in a certain standard
arithmetical theory. We shall also discuss topological interpretation of the systems and
the Intuitionistic logic in term of the Cantor derivative and the Hausdor4 residue. We
are happy to contribute a little piece of our own thinking on these matters.
We shall present a diagram with comments, mixing algebraic and modal viewpoints,
and will try to emphasize some of the most important modal systems having a topo-
logical tinge. We shall not make a point of mentioning Tarski’s name at each place in
this lecture, where his inCuence is either directly or indirectly present.
1. Triplets
An arbitrary topological space X gives rise to three concrete “algebraic” structures:
Op(X)=The algebra of open sets,
(P(X); c)=Closure algebra,
(P(X); d)=Derivative algebra.
Note that the usual intuitively obvious connection between closure and derivative op-
erations is cA=A∪dA.
2. Abstract level
(H;∨;∧;→;⊥) (B;∨;∧;−; c) (B;∨;∧;−; d)
Heyting algebra Closure algebra Derivative algebra
Recall that a Heyting algebra (H;∨;∧;→;⊥) is a distributive lattice (with smallest
element ⊥), endowed with a binary operation (relative pseudocomplement) → such
that x6a→ b i3 a∧ x6b. An algebra (B;∨;∧;−; c) is called a Closure algebra if
(B;∨;∧;−) is a Boolean algebra and the operator c satisNes “Kuratowski axioms”:
a6ca; cca= ca; c(a∨ b)= ca∨ cb; c⊥=⊥.
Remark. In Appendix I. Derivative algebra of the paper [33], McKinsey and Tarski
initiated an investigation of the fundamental topological operation of derivation from
a purely algebraic (and=or modal) point of view. On p. 182 of [33] the authors say:
“Like the topological operation of closure, other topological operations can be treated
in an algebraic way. This may be especially interesting in regard to those operations
which are not deNnable in terms of closure... An especially important notion is that of
the derivative of a point set A which will be denoted by dA”.
Thus, Derivative algebras are Boolean algebras with an unary operation d, which
captures algebraic properties of the topological derivation. Recall that dA is, by deN-
nition, the set of all accumulation (alias, limit) points of a subset A of a topological
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space X . A point x is said to be a limit-point of a set A, if every neighborhood of x
contains a point of A other than x.
Denition 1. We say, that a Boolean algebra B is a Derivative algebra with respect
to the operation d, if (1) d⊥=⊥, (2) d(a∨ b)= da∨ db, (3*) dda6a∨ da.
Remark. It must be pointed out that we weaken the deNnition of Derivative algebra
[33] slightly; namely, we postulate the condition (3*) instead of (3) dda6da. We
justify this weakening by noting that there are topological spaces, in which condition
(3) is not valid (for example, spaces with anti-discrete topology).
3. Three logical systems
HC= the Heyting Calculus
S4= the Lewis Modal system
wK4= a slightly weakened version of the modal system K4;
namely, wK4=K + p∧ p→ p, where the system K (named after Kripke) is the
basic normal modal logic whose axioms are all Boolean tautologies and all expres-
sions of the form (p→ q)→ ( p→ q) and whose rules are modus ponens and
necessitation. The diamond ♦ as usual means the dual ¬ ¬ of .
Recall that a relational semantics for the system K is based on the notion of a
Kripke frame, that is, a pair (X; R) where X is nonempty set (“of possible worlds”)
and R is a binary relation on X (“accessibility relation”). A valuation is a function
f assigning to each propositional letter p a subset f(p) of X (“the set of worlds
in which p is true”). The valuation is then extended to all formulae via the obvious
deNnitions for Boolean connectives, together with x∈f(♦p) i3 ∃y∈X such that xRy
and y∈f(p). A formula p is valid in (X; R) i3 f(p)=X . For detailed exposition
of modal logic we refer the reader to the comprehensive textbook [10] or to any
other source on modal logic. Relational semantics for the system wK4 is based on the
notion of Kripke frame with a weak-transitive accessibility relation. This terminology
was inspired by the following “discussion”: “This is continuation of the discussion
initiated in the papers XXIV 185(1; 2). In spite of disagreements on the way, the
polemic ends with all parties agreeing that notion of weak-transitivity of a relation R,
characterized by x =y& xRy&yRz⇒ xRz must be distinguished from that of strong
transitivity, characterized by xRy&yRz⇒ xRz” [11].
The reason for our favoring the system wK4 and weak-transitivity as follows.
Proposition 1 (Esakia [12,20]). (a) Relational completeness of wK4:
wK4 p i4 p is valid in every weak-transitive Kripke frame:
(b) Topological completeness of wK4 :wK4p i4 p is valid in every topological
space; in other words, wK4 is the Logic of topological spaces (under reading the
diamond-modality ♦ as the derivative operation).
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Let X be a topological space. Every topological valuation, i.e., function mapping
propositional letters to subsets of X , can be extended to a map assigning subsets of X
to all formulae by the inductive deNnition: f(p∧ q)=f(p)∩f(q), f(p∨ q)=f(p)∪
f(q); f(¬p)=X −f(p) and f(♦p)= df(p), where d is the derivative of the topo-
logical space X . A formula p is valid in a space X if f(p)=X for every valu-
ation f. The implications of this proposition are obvious. From the point of view
of the axiomatic foundation of topology, Proposition 1(b) shows that the system of
postulates for derivative algebras (or for topological spaces in terms of derivative)
has a certain completeness property: every “topological” equation, which is identically
true in all topological spaces, can be derived from these postulates. (see Sections 8.1
and 8.3).
For the system K4, we need to impose some restriction on topological spaces. Recall
that X is said to be a Td-space if every singleton subset of X is the intersection of
an open and a closed subset. This separation axiom, introduced by Aull and Thron
[3], proved to play important roˆle in the context of lattice-equivalence of topological
spaces.
Recall that the system K4 is obtained by adding p→ p to K as a new axiom
schema. It is appropriate to mention here that axioms and necessitation rule of the
system K4 are modal simulations of the Hilbert–Bernays derivability conditions; they
are called derivability conditions because they are formalizations of the proof predicate
Bew(:). In short, K4 axiomatized those properties of Bew(:) that do not depend on the
GDodel’s diagonal lemma.
Proposition 2 (Esakia [12,20]). Topological completeness of K4 :K4p i4 p is valid
in every Td-space.
We now go back a little in time to look at early result of Tarski, who soon began
to exert the decisive inCuence in a semantics of the intuitionistic logic.
First, we recall Tarski’s topological interpretation of intuitionistic logic; we assign an
open subset f(p) of a topological space X to each propositional letter p. The valuation
is extended inductively to all formulae by deNnition: f(⊥)= ∅; f(p∧ q)=f(p)∩
f(q); f(p∨ q)=f(p)∪f(q), f(p→ q)=X − c(f(p)−f(q)). A formula p is valid
in a topological space X if for every valuation f; f(p)=X .
Proposition 3 (Tarski [43]). Topological completeness of HC:
(a) HCp i4 p is valid in every topological spaces (the intuitionistic connectives
interpreted by the operations of the lattice of open sets);
(b) HCp i4 p is valid in Euclidean space (of any number of dimensions).
Proposition 4 (McKinsey and Tarski [35]). Topological completeness of S4:
(a) S4p i4 p is valid in every topological spaces (under reading of the diamond-
modality ♦ as closure operator c),
(b) S4p i4 p is valid in Euclidean space.
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4. Classical connection
HC Tr→S4 Sp→wK4;
where “Tr” is the GDodel translation and “Sp” is the splitting map; namely, Sp is a
mapping of the set of the modal formulae into itself, which commutes with Boolean
connectives and Sp(♦p)=p∨♦p, Sp( p)=p∧ p (Compare with the topo-
logical connection: cA=A∪ dA). GDodel [23] observed that there is a theorem-preserving
translation of Heyting’s intuitionistic Calculus HC into the modal system S4. He “pre-
sumed” further that the translation is deducibility-invariant, i.e. that a formula is an
HC-theorem precisely when its translate is an S4-theorem. This was later veriNed by
McKinsey and Tarski [34], which showed among other things that the modal trans-
lation Tr proposed by GDodel does indeed give rise to an interpretation of the Heyting
Calculus in the Lewis system S4. Namely, one has
Proposition 5 (GDodel [23], McKinsey and Tarski [34]). HCp i4 S4Tr(p).
It is not hard to verify that (see Section 8.3).
Proposition 6 (Esakia [20]). S4p i4 wK4Sp(p).
5. Modern connection
5.1. Provability interpretation
HC Tr→ GRZ Sp→ GL:
In 1967 Grzegorczyk [25] axiomatically deNnes a modal system GRZ (named after
him), which is a proper normal extension of the system S4 and proves that HC could
be embedded (via the GDodel translation) in the system GRZ. GRZ is the system that
results when the schema ( (p→ p)→p)→p is added to the modal system S4.
Proposition 7 (Grzegorczyk [25]). HCp i4 GRZTr(p).
The GDodel–LDob Modal system GL (alias, the provability logic) is of interest since
it adequately reCects the behavior of formalized Provability Predicate in Peano Arith-
metic PA. GL is the result of adding the axiom schema ( p→p)→ p to K4. In
1976 Solovay deNne an arithmetic realization of modal formulae of the system GL
(by reading the box-modality as “it is provable in PA” and the diamond-modality
♦ as “is consistent with PA”) and proves its arithmetical completeness. Using more
technical terminology, we say that an arithmetic realization ( )∗ of modal formulae is
an assignment to each atom p an arithmetic sentence p∗ which commutes with non-
modal connectives and ( p)∗=Bew(pp∗q) where Bew(:) is the standard provability
predicate for the PA.
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Proposition 8 (Solovay [42]). Arithmetical completeness of GL:
GLp i4 under all arithmetical realizations ( )∗ the sentence p∗ is provable
in PA.
Proposition 9 (Kuznetsov and Muravitsky [28], Goldblatt [24], Boolos [8]). GRZp
i4 GLSp(p).
We recall that a sentence of PA is demonstrable if it is provable and true. Since every
provable sentence is true, the distinction between provability and demonstrability is one
in “intension” only, but LDob’s Theorem shows that Bew(s)∧ s (the arithmetization of
the assertion that s is demonstrable) is equivalent to Bew(s) (the arithmetization of the
assertion that s is provable) only if s is actually provable. Let us abbreviate Bew(s)∧ s
as “Dem(s)”; under reading of the box-modality as Dem, we have as a by-product
of Propositions 8 and 9 the following:
Proposition 10. Arithmetical completeness of GRZ:
GRZp i4 PA p∗.
Thus the formulae of whose provability-true translations are theorems of PA are
precisely the theorems of GRZ!
It should be noted that as a by-product of modern connection we obtain (using
the composition Tr, Sp and the Solovay arithmetic interpretation ( )∗) an adequate
provability interpretation of HC!
The following observation was made by Segerberg:
Proposition 11 (Segerberg [39]). Relational completeness of GL:
The theorems of GL are precisely formulae valid in all Kripke frames in which
accessibility relation is transitive and well-founded.
Proposition 12 (Esakia [13,14]). GRZ is the largest modal system in which HC can
be embedded by the G0odel translation Tr.
Proposition 13 (Blok [6], Esakia [13]).
Lat(HC) ∼= Lat(GRZ);
i.e. the lattice Lat(HC) of all intermediate logics is isomorphic to the lattice Lat(GRZ)
of all normal extensions of the system GRZ.
It is appropriate to mention here system S4.1 Nrst deNned in McKinsey [32]. S4.1 is
the modal system obtained by adding ♦p→♦ p to S4 as a new axiom schema.
McKinsey writes [32, p. 83]: “As the intuitive basis for the syntactical deNnition of
possibility, I take the position that to say a sentence is possible means that there exists
a true sentence of the same form. Thus, for example, it would be said that the sentence
‘Lions are indigenous to Alaska’ is possible because of the fact that the sentence ‘Lions
are indigenous to Africa’, has the same form and true”.
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We say that a reCexive and transitive relation R on X has the McKinsey property
if every point has an alternative which has itself as only alternative, i.e.
∀x∃y(xRy&∀z(yRz ⇒ z = y)):
Lemmon and Scott [30] (see also [38]) showed that S4.1 was determined by the class
of quasi-orders (X; R) in which R has the McKinsey property. What makes S4.1 of
interest is that the system S4.1 (just as S4) is a modal “companion” of intuitionistic
logic [15], i.e.
HC  p i3 S4:1  Tr(p):
As we noted above, the system K4 is evidently sound with respect to arithmetic se-
mantics, but it is not complete. An important example of a formula unprovable in K4
is (G) ¬ ⊥→¬ ¬ ⊥ (a modal version of the famous GDodel’s second incomplete-
ness theorem). Denote by K4.G the modal system obtained by adding (G) to K4 as
a new axiom. In the interest of historic completeness we also present the following
“intermediate” connection:
HC Tr→S4:1 Sp→ wK4:G:
Same relevant comments concerning this connection are relegated to Section 8.4.
We conclude this topic with a calculus of sequents for the modal system S4.1 which
was discovered by Grigori Mints (private communication):
Denition 2 (Mints). S4.1 is the calculus of sequents that results when the following
“enigmatic” rule (MR) is added to the calculus of sequents for S4:
(MR)
!− →
!→ ,
where !−= {p− :p∈!} and p− is the result of removing from p all occurrences of
the modal operator . As usual != { p :p∈!}.
Proposition 14 (Mints). S4.1 admits cut elimination.
6. From a topological point of view
Denition 3 (Cantor). A topological space is called a scattered space if it has no
dense-in-itself non-empty subset.
An “equational” (a lXa Kuratowski) characterization of scattered spaces using the
derivation operation as a primitive notion is contained in
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Proposition 15 (Esakia [16]). A scattered space is a set X equipped with an operator
d, satisfying the equations: (1) d⊥=⊥, (2) d(A∪B)= dA∪ dB and (3) dA= d(A −
dA) (the dual form of the L0ob formula).
(See Addendum, Section 8.5)
Corollary 1 (Esakia [16] (see also, Esakia [17] and Bernardi and Aquino [4])). Top-
ological completeness of GL:
GLp i4 p is valid in every scattered space.
Let !(#) denote the space of ordinals not exceeding # with its interval topology. It
is known that for every ordinal # !(#) is a scattered space [31].
Proposition 16 (Abashidze [1], Blass [5]). GLp i4 p is valid in !(!!).
Proposition 17 (Abashidze and Esakia [2]). The Heyting propositional calculus HC,
the system GRZ and the Provability Logic GL admit an adequate topological inter-
pretation in terms of the ordinal space !(!!).
Note that from the point of view of the axiomatic foundation of topology, Proposition
15 and Corollary 1 show that the axioms for scattered space in terms of derivative have
a certain completeness property. Propositions 16 and 17 imply that if a “topological”
equation fails in some scattered space (or even in some diagonalizable algebra) we can
be sure of Nnding a counter-example for it in a suitable ordinal space (or even in the
ordinal space of the form !(!n) for suitable n)
One more bit of notation.
Denition 4 (Hausdor3). If f(A)= cA − A is the boundary of the complement of a
subset A of a topological space X , then the set ff(A)=Res(A) is called the residue
of A. Otherwise, Res(A) = A ∩ c(cA− A).
We introduce the following.
Denition 5 (Esakia [16] (see also [17])). A topological space X is called H -reducible
if every subset A of X , A = ∅ implies A− ResA = ∅.
An “equation” characterization of this class of spaces in terms of the residue can be
found in [16]: a space X is H -reducible i3 cA = c(A− ResA) for each A ⊆ X .
It is not hard to verify that every scattered space is H -reducible. An example of a
scattered space which is not H -reducible has been constructed in [7]; in that paper there
has been also shown that scatteredness and H -reducibility coincide on a wide class of
spaces, including all of the spectral, Nrst countable, or locally compact Hausdor3 spaces
(see Corollary 4.7 there).
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Proposition 18 (Esakia [16]). Topological completeness of GRZ:
GRZp i4 p is valid in every H -reducible topological space (under reading the
diamond ♦ as closure operation c).
Proposition 19 (Gabelaia [22]). Topological completeness of S4.1:
S4:1p i4 p is valid in every topological space X in which the boundary of any
subset A of X is nowhere dense.
Denition 6 (Esakia [19]). A Heyting algebra H is called a frontal Heyting algebra if
for every element a of H the Nlter Fa= {b∈H : b→ a6b} is a principal Nlter.
Example. The lattice Op(X ) of all opens of a scattered space is a frontal Heyting
algebra [19].
Using a signiNcant result of Kuznetsov [29] and [36] we obtain:
Proposition 20 (Esakia [19]). Every variety of Heyting algebras is generated by the
class of its frontal Heyting algebras.
In 1976 Segerberg explicitly formulated the logic of elsewhere. Segerberg [40]: says
“George Henrik von Wright seems to have been the Nrst to notice the fact, overlooked
by everyone else, that ‘somewhere else’ has an interesting logic of its own, distinct
from that of S5-operator ‘somewhere’ ”. Recently this logic (we shall call its KS, after
Krister Segerberg) has received a good deal of attention (Goranko, Venema, de Rijke;
see, for example, [37]).
In our notation the logic KS can be described as follows: KS=wK4+(p→ ♦p).
The intended kind of Kripke frame (X; R) is one in which R is the “dissident” relation,
i.e. xRy i3 x =y. Note that the dissident relation = is a simple example of a relation,
which is weak-transitive (and even symmetric) but is not transitive!
Segerberg presented a completeness result.
Proposition 21 (Segerberg [41]). The Logic KS may be identi8ed with the set of
formulae valid in all frames of this kind.
In an algebraic context we obtain weak Monadic algebras, i.e. Derivative algebras
(B; d), in which the operator d satisNes the additional equality
a ∧ d − da = ⊥:
It must be pointed out that every Monadic algebra is a weak Monadic algebra satisfying
the condition a6da. The Monadic algebras were introduced by Halmos [26] in his
study of algebraic logic. The equational class of weak Monadic algebras (as well as
the class of Monadic algebras) is semisimple and locally Nnite [20].
The alternative topological semantics for this logic is based on the notion of anti-
discrete topology:
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Proposition 22 (Esakia [12,20]). The Logic KS may be identi8ed with the set of for-
mulae valid in all spaces with the antidiscrete topology (under reading the diamond-
modality ♦ as a derivative d).
7. A quantier extension of the Heyting calculus
We now present (and try to justify) an amendment to the standard quantiNer
extension QHC of the Heyting propositional calculus HC. Namely, our amended cal-
culus Q+HC is obtained from the usual QHC by postulating the following modiNed
version of the rule of universal generalization:
(+)
 (P(a)→ ∀xP(x))→ P(a)
 ∀xP(x) .
This amendment was inspired by the provability interpretation of the intuitionistic
predicate logic (via the GDodel modal translation and Solovay’s arithmetical complete-
ness Theorem).
Proposition 23 (Esakia [18]). The Amended Intuitionistic Predicate Logic Q+HC ad-
mits a Provability interpretation in Peano arithmetic PA.
An alternative deNnition of Q+HC is expressed by
Proposition 24 (Esakia [18]). The calculus Q+HC is equivalent to the calculus ob-
tained from the usual QHC by accepting as an additional axiom the formula (Casari’s
schema):
(Cas) ∀x[(P(x)→ ∀xP(x))→ ∀xP(x)]→ ∀xP(x).
Recall the remark of Heyting [27, p. 104] in connection with the formula ¬¬∀xP(x)
→∀x¬¬P(x): “It is one of the most striking features of intuitionistic logic that the
inverse implication does not hold, especially because the formula of the propositional
calculus which results if we restrict x to a Nnite set, is true”. And further: “It has
been conjectured [S. Kuroda 1951, p.46] that the formula ∀x¬¬P(x)→¬¬∀xP(x) is
always true if x ranges over a denumerable inNnite species, but no way of proving the
conjecture present itself at present”.
It is not hard to verify that ∀x¬¬P(x)→¬¬∀xP(x) (and consequently also the
biconditional ∀x¬¬P(x)↔¬¬∀xP(x)) is provable in Q+HC.
Let us note some semantical features of the amended calculus Q+HC [18,21]:
(1) QuantiNer models of Q+HC include all Kripke models with well-founded base
(X; R) and, hence, all Nnitary, i.e. the ones with Nnite base (X; R).
(2) Of the sheaf models, the logic Q+HC admits the sheaf toposes only over scattered
spaces and hence also over ordinal spaces.
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8. Addendum
During his visit to Tbilisi, Tarski proposed to us to investigate the derivative algebras
and the corresponding modal system and prove its topological completeness. This topic
(presented in the Appendix to [33]) opened more questions that it has answered. I
found it appropriate to include in the paper results that have been obtained by us in
this direction. These results are directly related to the Tarski “topological” problematics
and complement the aforementioned Appendix.
It is desirable to exchange some economy for added clarity. We conclude this paper
with a few comments mainly concerning with topological and relational semantics for
the new modal systems wK4, K4.G and the GDodel–LDob system GL.
8.1. Relational semantics of wK4
Let (X; R) be a Kripke frame, i.e. X is a non-empty set and R is an arbitrary binary
relation on X . It can easily be shown that
(a) the frame (X; R) is a wK4-frame (i.e. all axioms of wK4 are valid in (X; R)) i3
the relation R is weak-transitive;
(b) the canonical (alias, descriptive) frame of the system wK4 is weak-transitive.
We shall now deNne (by analogy with Russell) ancestral relation R∗.
Denition. xR∗y⇔ xRy or (x =y and there exist points x1; x2; : : : ; xn of X such that
xRx1Rx2 : : : xnRy).
(c) The relation R∗ is the weak-transitive closure of R, i.e. R∗ is the least weak-
transitive relation containing R.
Using the Nltration method (mutatis mutandis) it is not hard to verify that the weak-
transitive closure of the least Nltration of a weak-transitive model X through any set of
formulae S is itself a Nltration of X through S (cf., [38, Lemma 2]). From these remarks
the Nnite model property of wK4 follows at once: the system wK4 is characterized by
the class of all Nnite weak-transitive frames.
8.2. Topological semantics of wK4
In every topological space X the derived set operation satisNes conditions: d(⊥)=⊥;
d(A∪B)= dA∪ dB, which follows directly from the deNnition of a derivative operator.
It is not diZcult to verify that ddA⊆A∪ dA for any A⊆X . Indeed, suppose x∈ ddA.
Then for every neighborhood Ux of x there exists y = x such that y∈Ux ∩ dA. Because
of y∈ dA, for every neighborhood of y and in particular for Ux we have Ux ∩ d(A −
y) = ∅ and all the more Ux ∩ dA = ∅. Since every neighborhood Ux of x contains points
of A, it follows that x∈ cA=A∪ dA. Note that we have no reason for the conclusion
x∈ dA, as Ux∩ (A − x)= ∅ is possible (for example, if X is a set endowed with the
antidiscrete topology). Thus, all axioms of wK4 are valid in every topological space.
It is known that there is a one-to-one correspondence between topologies on a Nnite
set X and quasiordering relations on X . Every topology (X; c) determines a quasiorder
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Q by xQy i3 x∈ c({x}). Conversely, each quasiorder Q deNnes a topology: for every
set A⊆X cA=Q−1A, where Q−1A=⋃{Q−1(x): x∈A} and Q−1(x)= {y :yQx}.
We need the following more esoteric variant of this correspondence which seems
interesting in itself [12,20].
Observation. There is a one-to-one correspondence between topologies on a 8nite set
X and irre<exive, weak-transitive relations on X .
We need to modify the correspondence presented above slightly. Namely, each ir-
reCexive, weak-transitive relation R on X deNnes a topology: the reCexive closure Q
of R (i.e. xQy⇔ xRy or x=y) is a quasiorder on X . Therefore, (X; c) is a topological
space where as above cA=Q−1A, besides the operator dA=R−1A coincide with the
derived set of A with respect to this topology. Conversely, with a topological space
(X; c) we associate a relation R deNned by xRy⇔ x∈ d(y), where d is the derivative
operator of the space. It is easy to verify that R is a weak-transitive and irreCexive
(as x =∈ d(x)) relation. It follows from the above considerations that only irreCexive
and weak-transitive Kripke frames (X; R) “give” topologies. However from a modal
and=or algebraic point of view we can restrict ourselves to this special “irreCexive”
frames. Indeed, the following observation implies that a formula which is valid in
every irreCexive weak-transitive Nnite frame is also valid in every weak-transitive N-
nite frame.
Let (X; R) be a weak-transitive Nnite frame and f :Y →X be a map such that:
(a) |f−1(x)|=2 if x is a reCexive point of X , i.e. xRx.
(b) |f−1(x)|=1 otherwise.
We deNne a relation S on Y the following way: for all y; z ∈Y
(a′) ySz⇔y = z if y; z ∈f−1(x) and x is a reCexive point of X ,
(b′) ySz⇔f(y)Rf(z) in all other cases.
It is easily seen that (1) (Y; S) is an irreCexive weak-transitive Nnite frame and (2)
the map f satisNes the condition fS(x)=Rf(x) and therefore f is a p-morphism
of the frame (Y; S) onto (X; R). From the above considerations we obtain a reNned
version of the Nnite approximability of wK4: the modal system wK4 is characterized
by all irreCexive weak-transitive Nnite frames. As a by-product we have topological
completeness of wK4 (see, [20]).
8.3. The connection between wK4 and S4
It is easy to see that the splitting of the axioms of S4 is provable in wK4. It should
be mentioned that Sp( p→ p), the splitting of the axiom p→ p, is equiva-
lent to the axiom p∧ p→ p of wK4, i.e. wK4 (p∧ p→ p)↔Sp( p→
p). Thus, S4p only if wK4 Sp(p). To show the converse implication, we need
simple, but useful observation, which already opened the door for a semantical con-
nection between wK4 and S4:
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A relation R on a set X is weak-transitive i3 the reCexive closure Q of R is a
quasiorder on X .
Using this fact and the well-known theorem about completeness of S4 with respect
to quasiordered sets we obtain: S4p if and only if wK4Sp(p). Moreover, the modal
system wK4 is the least normal extension of the basic modal system K for which the
Sp-translation is true.
8.4. The connection between K4.G and S4.1
Let (B;C) be an arbitrary closure algebra and deNne B′= {a∈B : ICa6CIa}, where
as usual Ia=−C− a.
Key observation. B′ is a Boolean subalgebra of B closed under the closure operator C
and therefore the closure algebra (B′;C) satis8es the McKinsey condition ICa6CIa
for every a∈B′. Note that every open element a of B (i.e. Ia= a) belongs to B′.
It is known that the algebra H = {Ia: a∈B} of all open elements of an arbitrary
Closure algebra (B;C) is a Heyting algebra. Moreover it is not hard to show that
every Heyting algebra is isomorphic to the algebra of all open elements of a Closure
algebra (B;C) which satisNes the McKinsey property: ICa6CIa for all a in B [17].
The remarks made above can be applied to prove the embedding
HC Tr→ S4:1:
A comment on the translation: S4:1
Sp→ K4:G.
We must prove that S4:1p i3 K4:G Sp(p).
(A) (⇒). We already know that the splitting of all axioms of S4 (see Section
8.3) are derivable in wK4 (and the more, in K4). Therefore, it is only necessary to
verify that the splitting Sp( ♦p→♦ p) of the McKinsey axiom ♦p→♦ p is
derivable in K4.G. With the algebraic nomenclature at hand the logical terms can be
easily translated into algebraic language. Let (B; d) be a derivative algebra such that the
operator d satisNes the following conditions: dda6da (K4-axiom) and d6d(−d)
(an algebraic version of (G)), where  is the largest element of the Boolean algebra B.
Note that −d =(a∧− d)∨ (−a∧− d) and hence d6d− d i3 −d ∨ d−
d= i3 C(−d)= i3 (1) C((a∧−d)∨ (−a∧−d))=. Using the deNnitions
Ca= a∨ da and Ia= a∧ − d − a we obtain: (2) ICa6CIa is equivalent to C((a∧ −
d − a)∨ (−a∧ − da))=. As −d6 − da and −d6 − d − a for any a∈B we
have (a∧− d)∨ (−a∧− d)6(a∧− da)∨ (−a∧− d− a) and hence (3) C((a∧−
d)∨ (−a∧− d))6C((a∧− da)∨ (−a∧− d− a)). The equation (1) together with
(3) implies C((a∧− da)∨ (−a∧− d− a))=, i.e. ICa6CIa. Thus we have S4:1p
only if K4:G  Sp(p).
(B) (⇐). Let (X; R) be a Nnite transitive frame. It is not hard to verify that the
following conditions are equivalent:
(a) the axiom (G) ¬ ⊥→¬ ¬ ⊥ is valid in the Kripke frame (X; R),
(b) the relation R has the property:
∀x[∃x(xRy)⇒ ∃y(xRy&¬∃z(yRz))]:
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Supposing now that a formula p is not derivable in S4.1. As system S4.1 has
the Nnite frame property (see [38]) there exist a Nnite quasiorder with the McKinsey
property, say (X;Q), such that p is not valid in (X;Q). Denote by MaxX the set
of all maximal points of (X;Q) (as usually a point x∈X is a maximal point i3
∀y(xQy⇒ x=y)). We deNne a new relation R on X in the following
way:
(1) if x =y then xRy⇔ xQy and (2) if x=y then xRx⇔ xQx and x =∈MaxX . It is
then easily seen that Q is the reCexive closure of R and furthermore R has the property
(b). Hence the formula Sp(p) is not valid in (X; R). Thus, we obtain by contraposition
K4:G Sp(p)⇒S4:1p and therefore S4:1p⇔K4:G Sp(p).
8.5. The L0ob rule and Cantor’s “scatteredness”
It is possible to prove in an algebraic way, avoiding any “point” reasoning the
following slightly more general proposition, from which our desired Proposition 15
results immediately. Namely, Proposition 15 could be strengthened to assert
Proposition 15. For every Derivative algebra (B; d) the following conditions are equiv-
alent:
(A) The equation da= d(a− da) (the dual form of the L0ob Principle) is identically
valid in (B; d)
(B) (B; d) satis8es the dual form of the L0ob Rule, i.e.
for all a∈B a6da only if a=⊥.
Proof. (A⇒B). Suppose that a6da, i.e. a−da=⊥; then from (A) we obtain da= d⊥
=⊥. As a6da; a=⊥. To obtain the implication (A⇐B) we need the following
lemma.
Lemma. Every derivative algebra (B; d) satis8es the following condition: da− d(a−
da)6d[da− d(a− da)] for every a∈B.
Proof. Using axiom (2) of DeNnition 1, we obtain:
(a) da= d(a∧ da)∨ (d(a− da)). Multiplying this equation throughout by −d(a− da)
we have:
(b) da−d(a−da)= d(a∧ da)−d(a−da). Replacing a by a−da in the contraposition
−a− da6− dda of axiom (3∗) of DeNnition 1, we obtain
(c) −(a− da)− d(a− da)6− dd(a− da). Using da6− a∨ da6− (a− da) (c) gives
(d) da− d(a− da)6− dd(a− da); multiplying throughout by d(a∧ da) we have
(e) d(a∧ da)∧ da∧−d(a−da)6d(a∧ da)−dd(a−da). Using d(a∧ da)6da, (e) gives
(f) d(a∧ da)− d(a− da)6d(a∧ da)− dd(a− da); using (b) we obtain
(g) da− d(a− da)6d(a∧ da)− dd(a− da); using d(a∧ da)6dda and transitivity of
′′6′′, from the (g) we obtain
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(h) da− d(a− da)6dda− dd(a− da); Nnally, using da− db6d(a− b), we have the
condition asserted in the lemma:
da− d(a− da)6d[da− d(a− da)].
We now go back to the implication (A⇐B). Using (B), the lemma gives da−d(a−
da)=⊥, i.e. da6d(a− da). Thus, da= d(a− da).
Corollary 1. In every scattered space X the equation dA= d(A−dA) is true for every
A⊆X .
Recall [3] that a topological space X is a Td-space i3 the ”pointless” condition
ddA6dA is true for every subset A of X . Using a remarkable fact about GL (the proof
of which was independently discovered by de Jongh, Kripke and Sambin), namely, GL
 p→ p (see,for example, [9, Theorem 18, p. 11) we have
Corollary 2. Every scattered space is a Td-space.
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